Many theories, based on neuroscientific and psychological empirical evidence and on computational concepts, have been elaborated to explain the emergence of consciousness in the central nervous system. These theories propose key fundamental mechanisms to explain consciousness, but they only partially connect such mechanisms to the possible functional and adaptive role of consciousness. Recently, some cognitive and neuroscientific models try to solve this gap by linking consciousness to various aspects of goal-directed behaviour, the pivotal cognitive process that allows mammals to flexibly act in challenging environments. Here we propose the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness, a theory that links the main elements of consciousness theories to components and functions of goaldirected behaviour, ascribing a central role for consciousness to the goal-directed manipulation of internal representations. This manipulation relies on four specific computational operations to perform the flexible internal adaptation of all key elements of goal-directed computation, from the representations of objects to those of goals, actions, and plans. Finally, we propose the concept of 'manipulation agency' relating the sense of agency to the internal manipulation of representations. This allows us to propose that the subjective experience of consciousness is associated to the human capacity to generate and control a simulated internal reality that is vividly perceived and felt through the same perceptual and emotional mechanisms used to tackle the external world.
Introduction
Scientific theories of consciousness often focus on specific key mechanisms possibly relevant for it such as the neuronal networks that support conscious processing (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) , their informational integration Tononi, 2008; , the brain hierarchies (Damasio, 1989; Meyer & Damasio, 2009) , and the sensorimotor interactions involving brain, body, and the environment (O'Regan & Noe, 2001; O'Regan, Myin, & Noë, 2005) .
Similarly to Baars' approach stressing the possible functional elements and adaptive role of conscious cognition (Baars, 1997 (Baars, , 2005 Baars, Franklin, & Ramsoy, 2013; Baars, Ramsøy, & Laureys, 2003) , our approach to consciousness strongly focuses on the importance of considering the functional (adaptive) aspects of consciousness alongside the possible mechanisms that might support them, integrated to form a coherent system. In particular, here we propose a strong link between the main features of consciousness highlighted by the aforementioned theories and the pro-cesses and mechanisms involved in goal-directed behaviour (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Hills, 2006; . Goal-directed processes allow complex organisms to adapt to novel challenges of the environment through complex forms of mental simulation (Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Chersi, 2013) allowing them to plan actions ahead, to support complex decision making, and to solve challenging problems. Despite various authors mention possible links between consciousness and goal-directed processes (e.g., Bengio, 2017; Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005; Keller, 2014; Pennartz, 2017; Ressler, 2004; Rossano, 2003) , how the computational processes underlying goal-directed behaviour might be specifically related to conscious processing remains elusive.
Here we propose the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness. The theory posits that consciousness emerges within the goal-directed system of brain pivoting on this key main components and processes: a set of working memories mediating perception and imagination, an abstract working memory representing the main elements of goal-directed processes, a selection process ('internal manipulator') manipulating internal representations at all levels, and a motivational system driving the manipulator. In this proposal, a central role for consciousness is played by the goal-directed manipulation of internal representations. This manipulation process performs four classes of computational operations on internal representations: decomposition, composition, abstraction, and specification. The key adaptive function played by consciousness through these operations is to flexibly modify as desired all key elements of goal-directed processes, from the representations of objects and contexts to those of goals, actions, and plans. The theory allows the integration of the key elements proposed by the theories on consciousness while at the same time ascribing to them a functional/adaptive valence.
Finally, we relate the internal manipulation of representations to the sense of agency. This allows us to contribute to face the 'hard problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 1995) , in particular to propose a possible explanation of the subjective experience that accompanies conscious processes (Dennett, 1988; Haggard, 2017) . The contribution rests on a novel concept that we formulate here, of 'manipulation agency'. The idea is that the internal manipulation system underlying consciousness allows humans to actively and flexibly generate, control, and change as desired an internal simulated/imagined reality. The sense of agency given by this flexible and powerful control, together with the vividly sensed and felt experience of the imagined reality that is processed through the same perceptual and emotional mechanisms used to tackle the external world, gives rise to the subjective experience accompanying consciousness.
Overview of some theories of consciousness
Many theories have been proposed to explain consciousness as a propriety emergent from specific mechanisms of brain. Here we consider some major theories that propose articulated systems of concepts on consciousness that give a reasonable coverage of the relevant ideas on consciousness also developed in other theories. We start from the theory of Baars that has the merit to more strongly aim to propose a functional interpretation of conscious processes, i.e. which cognitive functions useful for adaptation these might play, an aim that we also follow here.
The global workspace theory of Baars (GWT, Baars 1997 ) proposes that consciousness relies on a set of fundamental elements that might metaphorically correspond to the elements of a theatre, the 'theatre of consciousness'. The fundamental elements are the conscious contents such as percepts, thoughts, and judgements ('actors in the stage'), the global workspace of working memory where conscious contents are represented ('theatre stage'), the selective attention that allocates limited processing resources to specific contents ('theatre spotlight'), the executive functions ('director') that, on the basis of the agent's current goals, decide which contents to activate, the unconscious background processes ('audience'), that contribute to furnish row information to the conscious contents (e.g. contextual information). The author recently grounded the model on neuroscientific evidence (Baars, 2005; Baars et al., 2013 Baars et al., , 2003 , in particular by linking the 'theatre elements' with neural structures and processes. Baars' theory follows an approach that best fits our functional approach to consciousness, and in this respect it can be considered a precursor of our proposal.
A related biologically-grounded theory, the neuronal workspace model (NWM; Dehaene and Changeux 2011), proposes the existence of two computational sub-spaces of brain networks to explain the emergence of conscious experience. A first sub-space is formed by many specialised functional modules (e.g., sensory areas or motor systems) characterised by high-density short/medium range connections. A second sub-space is formed by a distributed set of neurons, communicating trough excitatory long-range projections, involving the associative cortices (prefrontal, parietotemporal, and cingulate cortex) and including the fibers of corpus callosum and of the cortico-thalamic system (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011) . The NWM has been extended to envisage the existence of buffers (working memories) between the sensorial cortices and the neuronal workspace (Raffone, Srinivasan, & van Leeuwen, 2014 . Based on these anatomical organisation, the model proposes that the reverberating networks formed by the top-down projections (second interconnected computational space) and the bottom-up projections (first computational space) implement specific selective processes that lead to the emergence of a restricted set of relevant contents within consciousness.
Another influential theory of consciousness, the integrated information theory (IIT; Tononi 2008; Tononi et al. 2016) , proposes that a high anatomical and functional integration of a key brain sub-network, namely the thalamocortical system, represents a critical element of consciousness. In particular, this theory proposes that the representations of the thalamo-cortical system are characterised by 'specificity', i.e. an substantial level of differentiation and segregation with respect to other competitive representations, and 'integration', i.e. a relevant level of information exchanged by the units that compose the same representation. A major strength of the theory is the proposal of a quantitative measure of the level of such specificity and integration, namely the Φ value. The theory postulates that a high Φ value represents the neural correlate of a subjective consciousness state. A recent update of the theory distinguishes a brain hot zone that supports the formation of conscious contents localised in the posterior cortices and a frontal-parietal system that supports task-monitoring processes, making conscious contents coherent.
Damasio (Damasio, 1989; Meyer & Damasio, 2009) has proposed another relevant theory, the convergencedivergence zones theory (CDZt), that focuses on the hierar-chical organisation of brain systems to explain the difference between conscious and subconscious representations. In particular, this theory postulates the existence of minor convergence zones, corresponding to the sensory cortices, and a major central convergence zone, corresponding to associative cortical areas (prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, and temporal cortex), that together form a hierarchy of convergence zones. The theory proposes that this architecture supports a progressive integration of information from perceptual to central areas that supports perceptual processes, and an inverse flow of information that supports imaginary processes. The theory also focuses on the emotional dimension of conscious experience by referring to the somatic marker theory to explain the emotional nuance of conscious representations (Bechara & Damasio, 2005) . In particular, the term 'somatic marker' refers to the influence, taking place within the major associative convergence zones, of somatic signals onto brain representations that thus receive a prioritisation bias for being consciously processed (Verdejo-García, Pérez-García, & Bechara, 2006) . O'Regan (O'Regan & Noe, 2001; O'Regan et al., 2005) proposed a sensorimotor theory of consciousness that, in line with the approaches of embodied cognition (Anderson, 2003; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004) and enactivism (Hutto, 2005) , goes beyond strictly cognitive processes to involve the close interaction between brain, body, and environment. In particular, the theory explains the features of conscious visual experience, proposing that 'sensorimotor contingencies' (the perception of world changes caused by actions) are fundamental features for the emergence of conscious experience. Furthermore, this theory explains the difference between a sensory experience and other types of neural processes (e.g. imagination or reasoning) suggesting the existence of two properties of action-contingent stimuli defined 'allerting' and 'corporality'. While allerting corresponds to the capacity of changing stimuli to exogenously attract our attention, corporality describes a phenomenal change of perception that is consequent to a motor act of the agent.
The goal-directed system
Goal-directed behaviour relies on sophisticated internal representations, such as the representations of objects, goals, and world models, and is involved in many higher order cognitive processes such as planning, reasoning, and problem solving. In this section we present contributions from different disciplines, in particular neurobiology, neuropsychology, psychology, and computational literature, that clarify relevant aspects of the processes that underlie goal directed behaviour in brain, behaviour, and artificial intelligence systems. The contributions are in part overlapping; they are also so wide that here we can only consider few main aspects of them.
Biological contributions
Given a specific condition of the environment, goaldirected behaviour allows an agent to exhibit different behaviours depending on the goal that it intends to pursue. In particular, the behaviour is not automatically triggered by specific stimuli, as in habitual behaviour relying on stimulus-response (S-R) associations (Yin & Knowlton, 2006) . Rather, it is guided by the future desired environment states on the basis of previously acquired action-outcome (A-O) associations (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998) . Goal-directed behaviour, initially studied in animal species such as rats, is phylogenetically more recent than habitual behaviour and relies on the evolutionary emergence of complex brain processes (Passingham & Wise, 2012) . Among these, planning processes allow animals to flexibly assemble sequences of actions in novel ways (Delatour & Gisquet-Verrier, 2000; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013) , reasoning processes allow the inference of new knowledge from previously acquired information (Aust, Range, Steurer, & Huber, 2008; Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006) , and problem solving processes allow the accomplishment of new goals by adjusting previously acquired knowledge (Newman, Carpenter, Varma, & Just, 2003) .
We now consider some main aspects of the brain goaldirected system (for more details, see Baldassarre, Caligiore, & Mannella, 2013; Caligiore, Arbib, Miall, & Baldassarre, 2019; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) .
States and the cortical pathways. Brain processes perceptual information through multiple hierarchies of cortical areas partially segregated by sensory modality, e.g. for hearing or vision (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991) . For example, visual information is processed from early occipital cortex, performing basic information processing such as the detection of image edges, towards higher associative cortices, processing information for object identification in the inferotemporal cortex ('ventral visual pathway') or for supporting the interaction with object based on and supporting object interaction, e.g. related to space location and size encoded in the parietal cortex ('dorsal visual pathway'; Goodale & Milner, 1992) . These areas support action performance by sending information to motor cortices (Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998) . They also send information to the multimodal integrative areas of prefrontal cortex (Passingham & Wise, 2012) , which then exert a top-down control both over motor areas and backward towards the perceptual cortical hierarchies to support attentional processes.
Goals and frontal cortex. Goals represent the pivotal components of goal-directed behaviour that distinguish it from habitual behaviour. In particular, within the behavioural psychology literature a goal is defined as an action outcome having biological value, such as a food pellet, that can drive the performance of a behaviour for the balancing of homeostasis (i.e for the satisfaction of an homeostatic drive; Balleine and Dickinson 1998; Berridge 2004) . More in general, in cognitive sciences a goal is defined as an internal representation of a desirable future state of the world. This representation can be internally re-activated, in the absence of its referent in the environment, for triggering actions directed to accomplish the world state corresponding to the goal (Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, & Baldassarre, 2013) . A goal representation (e.g., the internal representation of a food pellet) can be supported by different sensory modalities, as the smell and visual appearance, and by different hierarchical processes with an increasing level of abstraction and integration of sensory modalities (Mechelli, Price, Friston, & Ishai, 2004) . In the human brain, goals are formed within the orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex and are given motivational valence by lower-level representations within amygdala and nucleus accumbens Mirolli, Mannella, & Baldassarre, 2010; Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012) . Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex also encodes the more complex and abstract rules/situations that are instrumental for the attainment of biologicallyrelevant outcomes (Tsujimoto, Genovesio, & Wise, 2011) .
Selection and the basal ganglia.
A key brain mechanism supporting the selection of goal-directed behaviour elements, such as states, goals, and actions, is implemented by basal-ganglia (Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999) . These form basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops that originate from the associative and frontal regions of cortex, and feedback onto the same regions via the thalamus. These loops are partially segregated into parts specialised to support selection of cortical contents involving in particular (Yin & Knowlton, 2006) : motor cortices; associative cortices (parietal, temporal, and dorsal prefrontal cortex); and limbic cortices (orbital and ventromedial preforntal cortex). An overall fundamental pattern of brain is the one where the cortical pathways discussed above, hosting bottom-up and top-down information flow, are 'intercepted' by the basal-ganglia loops that perform selection of contents within them (Baldassarre, Caligiore, & Mannella, 2013) . We will see that this pattern is very important for the internal manipulation of information of the RIM theory proposed here.
Motivations. Motivations represent another component of GDB, strongly related to the formation and the internal activation of goals. In particular motivations are internal processes that, based on the organism's 'needs', guide the selection of certain behaviours and the modulation of other internal processes such as attention and learning. There are various types of motivations, but in general literature divided them in extrinsic (Panksepp, 1998) and intrinsic motivations (Baldassarre, 2011) . Extrinsic motivations refer to the basic physiological motivations linked to survival and the reproduction such as pain, hunger, and thirst (Panksepp, 1998) . These motivations can lead to form goals, for example in the form of visual/auditive internal representations of the envi-ronment resources that can satisfy them (e.g. food or water). In brain, extrinsic motivations are supported by areas such as the hypothalamus and amygdala and involve reward-related systems such as the dopamine system (Schultz, 2002) .
Intrinsic motivation, endowed with a more sophisticated cognition (Baldassarre & Mirolli, 2013; Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, & Ryan, 1991; Fantz, 1964; White, 1959) drive the acquisition of knowledge that might be later employed for the acquisition of biological relevant resources and are related to processes such as curiosity, exploration, play, novelty, surprise, the setting of own goals and the competence to accomplish them. Intrinsic motivations involve various brain structures, for example hippocampus for novelty detection (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Lisman & Grace, 2005) or the anterior cingulate cortex for surprise (O'Reilly et al., 2013; Paus, 2001) . Also intrinsic motivations can support the formation of goals .
Psychological contributions
Attention. Attention is a relevant process for goaldirected behaviour Attention processes allow the acquisition of relevant information while discarding irrelevant stimuli (selective attention; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) . They are also fundamental for the formation of goals formation and their internal re-activation. Attention can be divided in covert vs. overt attention (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 1987) , endogenous ('bottom-up') vs. exogenous ('top-down') attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990) .
Overt attention refers to the selection of environment information based on the control of sensors focusing on a particular portion of the environment or stimuli (e.g. the view of a food pellet regardless of the context where it is found). Covert attention refers to an internal selection process that can mentally isolate the relevant parts of an internal representation (e.g. to internally focus on a certain portion of an imagined scene). Both covert and overt attention can support the formation of focused representations of states, goals, and models of the world.
Regarding the second distinction, exogenous attention refers to externally-driven shifts of the attention focus, mostly caused by highly salient stimuli or stimulus changes, while endogenous attention involves a voluntary shift driven by the agents' goals (Ognibene & Baldassarre, 2015) . Endogenous attention is very important for goal-directed behaviour because it allows the internal activate of desired goals and also support reasoning processes and planning processes that rely on a serial scan of mental contents. These processes strongly rely on top-down driven sensory imagination processes (Mechelli et al., 2004; Seepanomwan, Caligiore, Cangelosi, & Baldassarre, 2015) .
Planning. Given a selected goal, planning processes use the knowledge on action-outcome contingencies to search a single action or an action sequence that leads to accomplish the desired goal (Delatour & Gisquet-Verrier, 2000; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013) . In humans, this searching process is supported by an 'internal simulation' assembling and testing actions sequences 'within the mind' rather than by acting in the environment in humans (Gerlach et al., 2011) . These processes might also involve non-human animals (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Clayton & Dickinson, 2010) . Planning processes are also supported by bottom-up mechanisms such as affordances that suggest the possible actions that could be useful and appropriate for a given condition or object (Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004; Rounis & Humphreys, 2015; Thill et al., 2013) .
Problem solving. Problem solving is a sophisticated version of planning, considered a fundamental element of human intelligence in early cognitive-science studies (Simon, 1975) . In early views, problem solving identifies the a flexible search of the correct sequence of actions to pass from an initial state to a final desired state (goal), so is analogous to planning. This view still has an important role in current artificial intelligence models and cognitive science interpretations of human problem solving (e.g. Condell et al. 2010; Waltz et al. 1999 ), but it overlooks the fact that life problem solving requires not only to find suitable sequences of actions to achieve the goal, but also to face knowledge gaps regarding the elements of planning, for examples the relevant objects, their functions, the actions to act on them, and the possible effects of actions (world model).
Neuro-psychological contributions
Executive functions. The neuro-psychology literature studies a set of processes defined 'executive functions' (Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000) that have a notable overlap with goal-directed behaviour processes studied in the biological literature but also add useful information. Executive functions support a coherent feedback-dependent goal-based top-down control of behaviour and rely on three fundamental processes, i.e. working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility.
Working memory. Working memory, also studied in psychology, is a fundamental process for goal-directed behaviour referring to the capacity of the brain to keep active information representations for prolongued periods of time. Without the persistent maintenance of information by working memory cognition could support only sensorimotor behaviours. Working memory can store information in a modality-specific form (Fiehler, Burke, Engel, Bien, & Rösler, 2008; Raffone et al., 2014) or in an highly integrated multimodal form (Baddeley, 2000; Wolters & Raffone, 2008) . Working memory is a fundamental process for the selection and active maintenance of goals and sub-goals, and for supporting planning and problem solving processes through the maintenance of representations regarding past or future world states and their possible causal/temporal links (world models).
Inhibitory control. Working memory processes have a synergistic interaction with inhibition processes, another fundamental key element underlying goal-directed behaviour. Inhibitory control allowing the focus on the selected goals by performing a continuous suppression of distractors, such as other goals, intervening stimuli, and irrelevant actions (Durston et al., 2002) .
Cognitive flexibility. The integrated interaction of working memory and inhibitory control allows the emergence of a third process defined, cognitive flexibility, related to the capacity to switch behavioural strategy depending on the external conditions. For example, in a . The integrated functioning of working-memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility allows the emergence of high-order forms of executive functions such as goal monitoring, planning, and problems solving.
Studies regarding the neural correlate of executive functions (Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Hartley & Speer, 2000; Robinson, Calamia, Gläscher, Bruss, & Tranel, 2014) highlight many structures that support goal-directed behaviour. In particular, working memory is suppo,rted by basal gangliacortical loops, hippocampus and high-order prefrontal cortices while inhibitory control mostly relies on basal-ganglia, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Durston et al., 2002) . Cognitive flexibility relies on a complex network involving various portions of basal-ganglia, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and parietal cortex (Leber, Turk-Browne, & Chun, 2008) . The monitoring of the attainment of sub-goals and final goals relies on frontal portions of prefrontal cortex (Desrochers, Burk, Badre, & Sheinberg, 2015) while the anterior cingulate cortex shows a strong involvement in the detection of the violation of expectations (Benn et al., 2014) .
Artificial intelligence contributions
Research on artificial intelligence, that initially was closely linked to the study of natural intelligence, gave an important theoretical foundation to the study of goal-directed processes (Russell & Norvig, 2016) . A first relevant contribution was the one on problem solving introduced above, positing that human intelligence is primarily directed to accomplish goals by searching suitable sequences of actions leading from an initial state to a final goal state passing through a number of intermediate sub-goals (Simon, 1975) . These processes involved the representation of the world states as whole elements, such as the configuration of the pieces on the board in the chess game.
Later this approach was developed by the research on planning that made the search of action sequences more efficient by factorising the representation of states into elements (e.g. 'objects') and relations between elements (e.g., 'being on', 'being part of') suitably expressed with logic symbols (Russell & Norvig, 2016) . On this basis, planning systems could hence focus and reason on fewer relevant elements and relations at a time.
This thread of research mostly proceeded in parallel with respect to the research on neural networks (McClelland & the PDPResearchGroup, 1986) , which has lately arrived to the great success of machine learning and deep neural networks (Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2017) . This success is now bringing new interest and energies to face the high-level problems tackled by planning and problem solving by using approaches based on neural networks (e.g., Baldassarre, 2001; Wayne et al., 2018) , a trend that is expected to deliver good outcomes also to the research on consciousness (e.g., see Bengio, 2017) .
The Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness: components and manipulation operations
In this section we present the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness, in particular the main 'components', or set of functions, that the theory posits to be at the core of consciousness processes (Figure 1) . As the brain works as a whole, these 'components' should be thought to have a limited segregation in brain, i.e. to have a relative overlap within the brain structures that implement them (Caligiore et al., 2019) .
(1) Perceptual working memory. This component is responsible for a bottom-up information processing supporting modal perception (visual, auditive, tactile, somatosensory, etc.) and the formation of increasingly abstract representations, e.g. it supports the processing of visual images from the retina and the formation of increasingly abstract representations, from low-level visual features (edges, corners, etc.) to higher level representations (more complex features, objects, and faces). The same component also supports a top-down information flow moving in the opposite direction and supporting imagination, i.e. the central re-activation of peripheral perceptual representations. The component, supported in brain by reverberating loops involving sensory cortices, has the capacity to implement modal working memories able to maintain active perceptual representations having a high level of details and possibly several dimensions. These activations also represent the conscious contents of which we are aware.
(2) Abstract working-memory. This component supports the active maintenance of goals and behavioural strategies in more abstract multimodal formats. This component, mostly supported by fronto-striatal circuits, forming reverberating loops with thalamus and basal ganglia, has the capacity of maintaining abstract representations of the world elements (context, objects, other agents), and of goals and action plans. These representations can be activated or de-activated as needed on the basis of the current condition, the goals to pursue, and the plans, decisions, and thoughts formulated to accomplish them.
(3) Top-down internal manipulator. This component, guided by motivationally-charged active goals, activates specific contents within the abstract working memory and the perceptual working memories, in particular by 'manipulating' them so to best use the agent's knowledge to pursue the currently desired goals. This component is actually fully embedded into the other three components. In particular, it is implemented by the biases from the motivational component, and by the selection processes internal to the abstract and perceptual working memories. The 'component' in particular relies on the excitatory fronto-parietal cortical pathways for the top-down guidance, on the disinhibition mechanisms of basal ganglia for performing macro selections, and on the local inhibitiory circuits of cortex for performing micro selections. The component allows the conscious flexible manipulation and morphing of externally-driven percepts (e.g., visual or somatosensory representations) and of selfactivated representations (imagination). The internal manipulator represents the keystone of the RIM theory.
(4) Motivation system. This component, supported in the brain by sub-cortical emotional systems such as the hypothalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, and the nucleus accumbens, furnishes the motivational valence to the representations within the other components. In particular, it supports the selection/activation of specific goals within the abstract working memory, thus forming 'intentions', and also supports the selection of other relevant elements, for example enhances the activation of representations related to objects and sub-goals relevant to support intentional behaviour.
The four components support the internal manipulation of representations proposed here to be at the core of consciousness. The manipulator performs operations that can be grouped into four classes (Figure 2 ). We extracted these four classes of operations from neuro-psychological and neuroscientific literature, for example on executive functions, attention, the selective processes of basal ganglia, and the hierarchical organisation of cortex. We think these operations are the main means through which conscious processing supports flexible goal-directed planning and problem solving. The four classes of operations are as follows.
(1) Decomposition. This operation, linked to the concept of selective attention, allows the separation of whole representations into pieces, thus allowing the agent to focus on single elements (e.g., objects in the world or specific subgoals) and their parts. This operation supports the focusing on specific portions of representations based on spatial regularities (space-based) or functional/visual regularities (e.g., object-based).
(2) Composition. A 'chunk', or 'composition', is a group of elements glued together by a higher-level semantic link (e.g., the eyes, nose, and mouth together form a Neuro-Functional Elements of the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) Theory Figure 1 . Schema showing the components of the RIM theory of consciousness. The colour gradient (red to blue) indicates a gradual change of computational functions from those encoding emotional/motivational elements (e.g. goals; fronto-striatal cortex) to those encoding perceptual elements (e.g. visual activations; occipital and dorso-caudal cortex) face). Neurally, a chunk can be implemented by connections that link the neural representations of the different elements and/or connections that link them to another neural representation of the semantic link. The connections allow the activation of the neural representation of the semantic link when needed, and to use it in place of the representations of the elements of the composition. Alongside such structural chunks, the composition also allows the formation of chunks through a functional connectivity, for example based on the synchronous firing of spiking-neurons encoding the items of to be chunked. Composition supports the assembling of items relevant for many goal-directed processes, for example the creation of action sequences forming a plan, or to consider wholes useful for problem solving.
(3) Abstraction. This operation allows the activation of internal representations that have less details or dimensions with respect to some original representations. There exist multiple possible abstractions of a pattern depending on the information that is preserved or discarded, so the process of abstraction needs to be biased in a specific direction. Abstraction is obtained by several features contributing to form more complex features or to identify the 'hidden causes' of given patterns. Abstraction is at the basis of the capacity of humans to consider specific aspects of objects while ignoring others, for example to focus on the colour, or the size, or the shape of an object. Furthermore, abstraction is strongly linked to the capacity to create simplified/compact representations of the world.
(4) Specification. Specification represents the inverse operation with respect to abstraction, in particular it adds details and dimensions to original abstract representations. Since specification implies few-to-many mappings, it requires that the process of specification is biased towards a desired direction. Neurally, specification is implemented by passing from abstract to more specific representations, for example by passing from hidden causes to full representations, for example to imagine some details of the face of a known person. This operation, together with composition, is thus behind the capacity of adding details to ideas and of imagining and creating new elements.
Conscious Knowledge Transfer (CKT). The integrated functioning of the four operations give rise to a superordinate function called here conscious knowledge transfer. CKT is an enhanced version of generalisation, intended here as the capacity of neural networks to respond in similar ways to similar stimuli; generalisation is in particular based on the interpolation between previous experiences or the extrapolation very proximal to such experiences. For example, an agent might experience an object on various positions at the centre of the table and on this basis imagine it a bit outside such centre (Nair et al., 2018) . Instead, CKT implies the capacity of extrapolating knowledge far beyond previous experiences, e.g. to imagine an object anywhere in a known space. Moreover, CKT involves all types of flexible active construction of knowledge that, starting from experience, can build fully new knowledge on the basis of the regularities extracted from such knowledge, for example those related to the physical properties of the environment, and to naturalistic and social knowledge (Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2017) . This construction of knowledge relies on knowledge building processes such as analogy (Gentner & Forbus, 2011) , induction, and other types of inference.
All these processes allow conscious agents to flexibly 'warp and morph' all elements of planning, such as contexts, objects, goals/sub-goals, and actions, in order to accomplish the desired goals in the lack of sufficient knowledge (flexible problem solving). For example, a goal might be split in never-experienced sub-goals trough decomposition; a new function of an object might be found by 'importing' it from another object through abstraction (which allows to see similarities), and by linking it to the object by composition; a plan might be searched at different levels of abstractions through abstraction and specification of objects/states and actions. Overall, these abilities are at the core of the flexible solution of new problems. New problems are challenging exactly because their solution requires knowledge that the agent initially does not have, and that has to be built through CKT processes. For example, in the classic problem of Duncker (Duncker, 1945) , formulated within the psychological literature on problem solving, a participant has to solve a problem of fixing a candle on a wall, and light it with some matches, using some pins in a box. The solution is to pin the cardboard box of the pins to the wall, and then to put the candle on it. Finding this solution requires to use abstraction to realise that the box is made of cardboard, and so can be pinned onto the wall, and to imagine by composition the never-seen compound formed by the box pinned to the wall and the candle on it.
Link to the neuroscientific and psychological theories
The components of the RIM theory of consciousness, which are grounded on the fundamental elements of the brain goal-directed system, can be linked to the main aspects of the theories of consciousness proposed in the literature and considered in the previous sections. This section draws some links between those elements to these aspects as examples, but many other links can be easily identified.
The global workspace theory (GWT; Baars, 1997) and the neuronal workspace model (NWM; Dehaene & Changeux, Figure 2 . The four fundamental classes of operations that can be performed by the representation internal-manipulator at the core of consciousness. 2011) suggest that the active maintenance of internal representations is a fundamental element of consciousness. This functionality can be related to both the central working memory component of the RIM theory, and the perceptual working memories. The two theories also stress the importance of the amplification of relevant information by higher order cortices. In particular, the NWM remarks the importance of the frontal-parietal system for the top-down selection of information. In the RIM theory, the amplification function relies on attention processes involving the top-down cortical pathways and also on the selection processes relying on the basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops . These selection processes play a crucial role in the RIM theory as they are at the basis of the internal manipulation of representations. Both theories stress the importance of a consciousness bottleneck, for which only one/few elements at a time enter the focus of attention. In the RIM theory, representations can take place at multiple levels of abstraction, so the manipulator has to select only one/few linked representations at a time to avoid interference between them.
The convergence-divergence zones theory (CDZt; Damasio, 1989) proposes the existence of a brain multi-level hierarchy for information processing, highlighting the fundamental difference between a abstract and perceptual processing and maintenance of information. The RIM theory of consciousness also gives a relevant importance to the hierarchical processing and maintenance of information, in particular at the level of abstract working memory and perceptual working memories, to support the key process of imagination.
The GWT and the NWM, and even more the somaticmarker hypothesis linked to the CDZt, assign a notable importance to the motivational/emotional processes for guiding conscious processes. In the RIM theory, the motivation system plays a fundamental role to guide the selections performed by the top-down internal manipulator onto the ab-stract and perceptual working memories. In this respect, the motivation system is at the apex of the hierarchy that ultimately establishes which information should be attended and which manipulations of internal representations should be performed.
The integrated information theory (IIT; Tononi, 2008) stresses the features of neural-network and cognitive architectures that can support conscious processes. We hypothesise that the circuits posited by the RIM theory might have a high Φ value (Tononi, 2008) . In particular, we posit that in brain the neural assemblies representing the elements relevant for goal-directed processes (e.g., in cortex), and the loops supporting their internal selection and manipulation (e.g., based on the cortical circuits and the basal gangliathalamo-cortical loops), should present a high-level of specificity and integration.
The sensorimotor theory of consciousness (O'Regan & Noe, 2001) emphasises the relevance for consciousness of the sensorimotor interaction that conscious agents engage with the environment, in particular for the role played by the causal action-outcome correlations that conscious agents can sense. The closest link that the RIM theory has with this view is that the theory is a functional theory that posits that consciousness is a process having an adaptive utility for agents as it allows them to produce more adaptive actions. In particular, conscious processes allow the flexible manipulation of internal representations and these support a more effective planning and a more powerful problem solving. The success of these processes requires a close alignment between the agents' internally manipulated representations and the world where they act, and a tight sensation-action coupling with it for action success, as claimed by the sensorimotor theory of consciousness.
Link to computational and machine-learning models: a research agenda
In this section we discuss some initial ideas on how the components of the RIM theory could be implemented in computational models (Figure 3) , while also drafting a possible research agenda to realise them.
A possibility to implement a computational model following the principles of the RIM theory would be to realise a model capable of performing planning processes as in classic AI systems, but based on neural networks (Baldassarre, 2001) . The use of neural networks, vs. symbolic approaches, to implement the system would be a condition necessary to allow the quantitative 'morphing and warping' of the internal representations of the system. Initially, the system could work on the basis of whole state/observations representations (Russell & Norvig, 2016) as commonly done in RL systems (R. S. Sutton & Barto, 1998) . This would allow the system to perform simple forms of planning as in Dyna planning (R. Sutton, 1990) , i.e. by using RL run on the basis of an internal model of the world rather than in the actual real world (Baldassarre, 2003) . This would require the system to learn a model of the environment on the basis of experience in the world, either before or during the accomplishment of desirable goals. Moreover, the system might be able to initially perform only one-step plans, involving the processing of the current state, of the goal, and of actions: this system might already allow the study of some elements of the internal manipulation of representations that is central to the theory (we discuss below a model inspired by the RIM theory exemplifying this).
It would be important to implement this initial system through the elements of the RIM theory. In particular, the states of the world should be processed through a generative model implementing a perceptual working memory, e.g. for processing visual information (we discuss below a model inspired by the RIM theory exemplifying this). The use of a generative model would allow the system to abstract information along the bottom-up information flow and to form neural representations capturing hidden causes of the percepts, possibly at different levels of abstraction. The topdown manipulation of these representations would allow the model to generate (imagine) different percepts. The goaldriven active imagination of different possible input stimuli could allow the creative solution of problems (as in the example model discussed below). Different generative models could be used to implement this component, such as Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM; Hinton, 2002) , variational autoencoders (VAE; Kingma & Welling, 2013) , or generative adversarial networks (GAN; Goodfellow et al., 2014 ).
An abstract working memory component could store persistent representations of the pursued goal, sub-goals, and other elements relevant for planning (and problem solving, see below). This component could be implemented through a recurrent neural network such as a long-short term memory (LSTM; Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) or transformers (Vaswani et al., 2017) . The use of the latter model could support an easier implementation of the internal attention selective processes needed to manipulate internal representations, via the manipulator system, thanks to the internal 'attention heads' of such model.
An internal manipulator component would allow the selection of elements needed for planning such as suitable representations of the initial state, goals, and actions to perform. This component could learn to select the internal representations of the system on the basis of reinforcement learning (RL) processes. Two strategies might be followed to this purpose. A first strategy, now successfully used in several works (e.g., Levine, Finn, Darrell, & Abbeel, 2016; Mnih et al., 2015) , would use an 'end-to-end' RL strategy where the reward is used to train by RL the outer action-oriented part of the model, and then to use a supervised gradient-based algorithm to train all layers of the system, here including the internal manipulation processes, down to the layers close to the input. A second strategy, that we are exploring at the moment, is inspired by the functioning of brain where reward signals (e.g., based on dopamine or noradrenaline neuromodulators) directly reach, and affect the learning of, the 'deep layers of the system. This strategy specifically implies to use reward signals to learn to select by RL not only the representations of the actions to perform in the environment, but also the internal representations of the system that affect the selection of such actions (we are at the moment developing some models implementing this idea).
A motivation system would furnish the reward signals to guide the learning of the manipulation processes of the system. These rewards might be generated by different possible mechanisms. They might just be standard rewards, as those commonly used in RL (R. S. Sutton & Barto, 1998) , or they might be represented by 'pseudo-rewards' indicating if a desired goal has been achieved. Alternatively, they might be represented by 'intrinsic rewards' (Baldassarre & Mirolli, 2013; Barto, Singh, & Chentanez, 2004) , or goal-related 'intrinsic pseudo-rewards', generated by intrinsic motivation mechanisms (Santucci, Baldassarre, & Mirolli, 2016) .
A further step of this research agenda might aim to implement a multi-step planning process allowing the system to accomplish goals that require a sequence of actions, rather than one action, to be accomplished (Wayne et al., 2018) .
Another fundamental step would be to enhance the system to allow it to do the 'morphing and warping' of internal representations advocated by the RIM theory to actively build lacking knowledge elements that are necessary to solve challenging problems that go beyond the need for a 'simple' planning. Crucially, the system should be able to 'search' solutions to problems not only by assembling sequences of actions, as in planning, but also by changing the internal representations of the key elements of planning on the basis of the four internal-manipulation operations of decomposition, composition, abstract, and specification. Generative models are relevant for this purpose as they show to have a notable potential to generate novel imagined representations by manipulating the internal representations capturing relevant hidden causes of learned stimuli (Bau et al., 2019; Klys, Snell, & Zemel, 2018) .
An important means of validation of the principles of the RIM theory would be to show their capacity to solve problems that require not only to accomplish goals by planning (and possibly also to autonomously acquire the knowledge on the world to support such planning) but also to solve problems that require elements that have not been previously experienced/learned by the agent. The system might for example be required to modify internal representations of experienced conditions, objects, and actions to form new ones allowing the solution of new problems.
The ideas above led us to implement two computational models aiming to implement some of the principles of the RIM theory. A first model (Baldassarre, Lord, Granato, & Santucci, 2019 ; see Figure 4 ) uses decomposition (based on overt and covert attention processes) to segment an overall goal into a number of sub-goals that the agent is able to solve. In particular, a goal assigned to the system required the creation of a certain configuration of objects in space (based on a simple custom simulator of simple 2D coloured circle/triangle/rectangle 'objects'). The agent could accomplish the overall goal by decomposing it into sub-problems thanks to the independence between the sub-goals: each subgoal could be accomplished by re-arranging the single object in the position and state indicated by the overall goal. The model could then accomplish each sub-goal through onestep planning operations involving the performance of single (hardwired) actions.
A second 'companion' model implements some initial mechanisms to perform abstraction and specification. The model reproduces the behaviour, and errors, of human participants of the Wisconsin card sorting test (WCST; Berg, n.d.; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993) , a standard neuropsychological test used to study cognitive flexibility. The model is able to actively apply abstraction on objects (cards to sort), thus extracting either their shape, or colour, or size, and then to search correspondences between objects, with respect to one of such dimensions, to solve the WCST. The model is in particular able to employ specification to imagine objects that are formed by specific attributes, for example to imagine a small, red, circle. These processes are based on a restricted Boltzmann machine that perceives cards and, with its 'hidden units', learns (for now based on a supervised algorithm) to encode the different shape/colour/size attributes of the objects depicted on them. The different possible attributes of the cards are then used to compare them along different dimensions and to solve the WCST by inferring the unknown rule to match the cards through a RL algorithm.
Manipulation agency and the subjective experience of consciousness
The nature of subjective experience is a widely debated issue within the philosophical literature. Many philosophers propose different ideas to explain the uniqueness of subjective experience such as the 'zombie argumentation' of Chalmers (Chalmers, 2003) , for which any physicalist explanation of subjective experience is deemed to fail, the red room mental experiment of Searle (Searle, 2004) , warning against the possibility of processing information without having a deep grasp of the process, or the list of fundamental features of qualia, i.e. private subjective sensations, of Dennet (Dennett, 1988) .
Some scientific theories of consciousness point to what should be the fundamental elements of subjective experience, for example through the concept of 'qualia space', a computational model capturing the functioning of brain thalamocortical networks at the basis of consciousness (Tononi, 2008) ; the drawing of a close link between visual experience and embodied sensorimotor loops (O'Regan & Noe, 2001) ; the emotional dimension of conscious experience (Damasio, 1996) ; or the dynamics of a complex distributed frontalparietal brain network proposed within the GWT (Baars et al., 2013; Seth, Baars, & Edelman, 2005) and NWM (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) . While we think that each of these proposals highlights a fundamental aspect of the subjective elements of conscious experience, it seems that they still remain unclear and that the RIM theory of consciousness proposed here might contribute to better understand them.
Based on the RIM theory, a conscious agent intentionally controls the representation internal-manipulator to create an internal simulated reality at will. This manipulation has a notable power as it relies on the four flexible primitive operations of manipulations illustrated above that can transform and warp internal representations in arbitrary ways. This power allows the agent to also internally simulate itself, e.g. based on images involving other similar agents: these might be possibly abstracted along various dimensions and then added, by composition, some features related to oneself, including elements of own cognition (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000) .
An key point of our view is that, based on mechanisms as those operating for the actions exerted on the external world, conscious agents have a sense of agency for the actions exerted through the internal manipulator on the internal reality generated by imagination. We call this manipulation agency.
The internally simulated and manipulated realty relies on imagination that involves also the lowest-level perceptual representations. The representations that the internal manipulator acts on are largely overlapped to those activated by the perception of the real world: this activation thus produces a vivid perceptual and emotional experiences similar to those produced by experiences in the real world. These processes are at the basis of the human intuition that we have an exclusive private access to our conscious thoughts, a fundamental feature of the concept of Qualia (Dennett, 1988 (Dennett, , 2001 .
To summarise, the RIM theory posits that the subjective experience of consciousness relies on the operations of the goal-driven representation internal-manipulator that allow the agent to intentionally create, and powerfully manipulate as desired, an internal reality that possibly includes elements of the agent itself and has the perceptual and emotional vividness of the outer world.
The concept of manipulation agency could also be used to propose a possible 'consciousness scale'. Increasing levels of manipulation agency could characterise three states of: phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and manipulative consciousness ( Figure 5 ). The three levels Figure 4 . Key elements of previous computational models that implemented some elements of the RIM theory. (Left) The model that can perform a decomposition of some types of goals into sub-goals based on decomposition . (Right) The model that performs selected types of abstraction and specification of input images . of manipulation agency could characterise different neurocognitive states accompanying three typical mental processing modes. In particular, an unexpected event could cause the transitory perception accompanied by a low level of control and manipulation agency. Mind-wandering, a common brain mode leading to explore sequences of conscious thoughts, and accompanying the performance of routine automatic activities or causing a mental shift from a specific tasks, often happening without awareness (Schooler et al., 2011) , might be characterised by a medium level of manipulation agency. At last, a high attention focus characterising states of mind as those achieved with mindfulness could be accompanied by the highest level of control on own cognition and hence of manipulation agency.
Our proposal could also clarify the difference between pseudo-hallucinations (which do not mimic real perception and are perceived as unreal), and hallucinations (perception in the absence of external stimuli, having the quality of real perception, Telles-Correia, Moreira, & Goncalves, 2015) . In particular, different alternations of manipulation agency could explain the presence of insight in pseudohallucinations, and its lack in true hallucinations. These states are also reported in ( Figure 5 ) to indicate the levels of manipulation agency possibly corresponding to them. The scale could also characterise dreams, involving uncontrolled imagination during REM sleep, and lucid dreams, involving controlled imagination during sleep (Stumbrys, Erlacher, Schädlich, & Schredl, 2012) . 
Conclusions
We introduced the representation internal-manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness. The theory views conscious processes as playing a key adaptive function for flexible planning and problem solving. The theory pivots on the idea that the processes of consciousness support the internal manipulation of representations of all aspects of goal-directed processes, from the representations of objects, to those of goals, actions, and plans. This manipulation relies on four cardinal operations (decomposition, composition, abstraction, and specification) that allow conscious representation manipulation to build new knowledge on the basis of previously acquired experience, a process called here conscious knowledge transfer.
We discussed how the RIM theory integrates various aspects of some main theories of consciousness, in particular by linking them to different elements of goal-directed processes at the basis of the theory. We also discussed preliminary ideas on the possible computational implementation of some elements of the theory based on current machine learning systems, and we briefly reviewed initial computational models implemented to capture some of the theory ideas.
Finally, we used the theory to propose a new interpretation of the subjective elements of conscious experience by relying on the new concept of manipulation agency. This indicates the sense that humans have of being able to manipulate as desired, in powerful ways, an internal imagined reality that possibly includes oneself and that is vividly sensed and felt as the outer world.
